PERMISSIVE POWERS 101

Caveat: This article originally appeared as a nine-part series on my other blog, Around the Scuttlebutt, in 2008. It is based on the Book of Order of the Presbyterian Church (USA) then in force. Subsequent replacement of that Book of Order with a new Form of Government may render this interpretation obsolete.
 

In a recent post, I discussed the growing disregard of the Constitution of the PC(USA) by imperial Louisville and its barons in some synods and presbyteries. I observed that in response, some churches have decided to forego requesting that their presbyteries dismiss them with their property and have exercised their “permissive powers of the congregation” to simply disaffiliate from the PC(USA).

A number of folks have posed a very astute question, to wit: “Huh? What are ‘permissive powers’?”

Good question. So following a practice of many pastors, I will begin a sermon series entitled “Permissive Powers 101.” Shall we begin?

Today’s reading comes from Chapter VII of the Book of Order.

Section G-7.0304a, provides:

a. Business to be transacted at meetings of the congregation shall include the following:

( 1 ) matters related to the electing of elders, deacons, and trustees ;
( 2 ) matters related to the calling of a pastor or pastors;
( 3 ) matters related to the pastoral relationship, such as changing the call, or requesting or consenting or declining to consent to dissolution;
( 4 ) matters related to buying, mortgaging, or selling real property (G-8.0500) ;
( 5 ) matters related to the permissive powers of a congregation, such as the desire to lodge all administrative responsibility in the session, or the request to presbytery for exemption from one or more requirements because of limited size. (Emphasis added.)

As you now peruse your well-thumbed copy of the Book of Order looking for the definition, I bid you a fond adieu.

As I will discuss later, the various “governing bodies” (session, presbytery, synod, and General Assembly) of the PC(USA) are constitutionally fashioned to have limited powers. Although referred to in the current Book of Order as “governing bodies;” traditional presbyterianism has always deemed its elected representative bodies, from the session through the General Assembly, to be judicatories or courts as opposed to legislatures. See, e.g., the ambiguous statement of Clifton Kirkpatrick, Stated Clerk of the General Assembly in amicus brief filed in the United States Supreme Court in Full Gospel Tabernacle, et al. v. Community School District 27, et al.(U.S. Supreme Court, No. 98-1714; May 26, 1999)(“ The General Assembly does not claim to speak for all Presbyterians, nor are its deliverances and policy statements binding on the membership of the Presbyterian Church. The General Assembly is the highest legislative and interpretive body of the denomination, and the final point of decision in all disputes. As such, its statements are considered worthy of the respect and prayerful consideration of all the denomination's members.” (emphasis added).)

The Kirkpatrick affidavit, repeated in numerous cases in which the PC(USA) filed "friend of the court" briefs, also undercuts the recent claim by Louisville that the PC(USA) is a hierarchical church. The statements of a legislature are mandatory, not simply “worthy of the respect and prayerful consideration.” You can bet that Pope Benedict, the head of a real hierarchical church, would never sign such a statement.

In fact, the Form of Government Task Force created by the 217th General Assembly has proposed that that term “governing bodies” be replaced by the word “councils” in the proposed new Form of Government.

Finally, the assertion by the bureaucracy that denominational polity does not provide any right to disaffiliate, that no such authority is given to a congregation, and that no such authority is delegated to the session, actually presents the foundation for the conclusion that such a power is therefore reserved to the congregation under the scheme of limited powers.

So, before we look at the powers of the congregation, we must consider the limited powers of judicatories/governing bodies/councils.

Beginning any discussion of power and jurisdiction within the PC(USA), it is important to remember that the denominational Constitution is prescriptive rather than proscriptive. A prescriptive constitution confers upon the judicatories of the denomination only those powers specifically enumerated. See, e.g., §G-1.0307, and §G-1.0308.

On the other hand, a proscriptive constitution surrenders to governing bodies all powers that are not specifically forbidden to them. It follows, then, that the governing bodies of the PC(USA) possess only those powers expressly delegated to them, respectively, in the Constitution. Any assertion to the contrary constitutes a patent usurpation of authority and contravenes the very foundations of Presbyterian polity.

Governing bodies have no civil authority or jurisdiction. See §G-9.0101. Moreover, the governing bodies have only shared ecclesiastical authority. Book of Order §G-9.0103 states in pertinent part:

All governing bodies of the Church are united by the nature of the Church and share with one another responsibilities, rights, and powers as provided in this Constitution.

While “higher” governing bodies may review the actions of a lower, the respect and obedience due to any governing body is both limited, §G-1.0307, and contingent, §C-6.174. The Permanent Judicial Commission of the General Assembly of the PC(USA) determined in Johnston et al. v. Heartland Presbytery, Remedial Case 217-2:

G-1.0400 does not characterize the task of governance as power and authority to carry out edicts, but in terms of arriving at the “collected wisdom and united voice of the whole Church”. While the Book of Order refers to a higher governing body’s “right of review and control of a lower one” (§G-4.0301f), these concepts must not be understood in hierarchical terms, but in light of the shared responsibility and power at the heart of Presbyterian order (G-4.0302) (emphasis added).

The Westminster Confession of Faith (as amended in 1788) states the limiting conditions on the authority of governing bodies:

. . . which decrees and determinations, if consonant to the Word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission, not only for their agreement with the Word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God, appointed thereunto in his Word (emphasis added).

The current tendency of some leaders in the PC(USA) to view the governing bodies of the church as legislative bodies is historically flawed. Until 1983, the proper reference was to “judicatories” rather than to “governing bodies. Although the descriptor was changed with the reunion of 1983, the functions remained essentially unchanged. The powers of sessions, presbyteries, synods and the General Assembly are powers of jurisdiction and interpretation of the Law of the Church which is the word of God. The Constitution, in both the Confessions and the Book of Order, is merely a historical compilation of the interpretation of that law by one particular branch of the Church universal.

It is also important to remember that § G-9.0103’s reservation of certain “powers not mentioned” is limited in its application to “governing bodies.” In other words, powers of governing bodies are distributed among the several judicatories, with those powers of the governing bodies which are not enumerated devolving to the presbytery. See, also, Strong and Bagby v. Synod of Mid-South (PCUS, 1976, pp. 92-99, (No. 1 - 1976)) (“It is critical to the maintenance of this form [of government] that the various [governing bodies] exercise the specific jurisdiction conferred upon them, neither usurping that not given them nor declining to exercise that given, whether by default or by attempted delegation. . . . ”) (emphasis added).

Strong and Bagby is often cited as support for the proposition that under the Book of Order of the PC(USA) only a presbytery can dismiss a congregation. Strong and Bagby was decided based on the Book of Church Order (“BCO”) of the old PCUS. There is no indication that the BCO contained any recognition that the congregation has its own discrete permissive powers, nor, apparently was any such issue briefed in that case.

Ultimately, the judicatories/governing bodies/councils of the denomination are limited in their jurisdiction to ecclesiastical matters, to be determined as a matter of theology. This limitation on church authority and jurisdiction was the genesis of the development by the United States Supreme Court of the “neutral principles of law” approach to instances in which church organizations were embroiled in matters of purely civil law.

The Book of Order recognizes a separate and distinct set of powers that belong, not to the “governing bodies,” but to the individual congregations. These powers are referred to as the “permissive powers of the congregation.” Book of Order, §G-7.0304a(5).

At least one chapter of the Book of Order begins with a section entitled “definitions,” (see, § G-9.0101. See, also, § G-9.0401). However, nowhere in the Book of Order can one find a definition of the elusive and ambiguous phrase “permissive powers of the congregation.” It is this very ambiguity that presents the greatest obstacle to those who argue that the power to depart must reside only in an all-powerful presbytery.

The doctrine contra proferentum stands for the proposition that an ambiguity in a document shall be construed against he who wrote the document. In this case, the Book of Order was written and adopted by bodies other than the congregations against whom it is being used. In fact, it was written by the very bodies who seek to benefit from their own interpretation of their ambiguity. The Book of Order is suspiciously akin to a contract of adhesion.

The General Assembly has long been aware of the ambiguity, see, e.g., Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex, 489 A.2d 1317, 1323 (Pa. 1985); Presbytery of Donegal v. Calhoun, 99 Pa. Cmwlth 300, 513 A. 2d 531, 538 (1986); Presbytery of Donegal v. Wheatley, 99 Pa. Cmwlth 312, 513 A. 2d 538,540 (1986).

It has always had the power to cure the ambiguity, but, for over 20 years, has failed to do so. Therefore, the ambiguity must be construed against the General Assembly (as sponsor and beneficiary of the Book of Order) and in favor of the congregations which had no say in the drafting and adoption thereof.

The conspicuous absence of a definition of the permissive powers of the congregation, coupled with the vague descriptive list in subparagraphs (1) through (4), leads to the necessity of a contextual definition. Studying the theme of §G-7.0304a, one comes to the conclusion that those powers include any that are central to the life and ministry of the congregation and that are not specifically granted to one of the governing bodies. It is reasonable to assume that such powers are those that are of greatest concern to, and which have the greatest impact on, the core identity of the individual congregation.

Note the limitation of this assertion: it claims for the congregation only those undefined powers that impinge upon its own ministry. By way of example, it makes no claim to the right to take under care inquirers or candidates or to examine candidates for ordination as Ministers of Word and Sacrament, or to exert judicial power beyond the four walls of its church.

So, what powers might fall within the rubric of “permissive powers?” Clearly, it is a general article or catch-all clause, intended to account for the distribution of powers not specifically mentioned but necessary to the function of the congregation and to protect it from the arbitrary exercise of unauthorized power by a “governing body.”

In this regard, § G-7.0304 is instructive. At §G-7.0304a, it provides:

a. Business to be transacted at meetings of the congregation shall include the following:
( 1 ) matters related to the electing of elders, deacons, and trustees ;
( 2 ) matters related to the calling of a pastor or pastors;
( 3 ) matters related to the pastoral relationship, such as changing the call, or requesting or consenting or declining to consent to dissolution;
( 4 ) matters related to buying, mortgaging, or selling real property (G-8.0500) ;
( 5 ) matters related to the permissive powers of a congregation, such as the desire to lodge all administrative responsibility in the session, or the request to presbytery for exemption from one or more requirements because of limited size. (Emphasis added.)

Some may opine that the list is exclusive, relying on § G-7.0304b:

b . Business at congregational meetings shall be limited to the foregoing matters (1) through (5). Whenever permitted by civil law, both ecclesiastical and corporate business may be conducted at the same congregational meeting.

However, when §G-7.0304 is read as a whole, that argument must fail, if for no other reason than that the entire section is ambiguous. The inclusion of the phrases “shall include” and “such as” clearly connote that the list is not exclusive and that other business “such as” the topics set forth may properly be “include[d].” In other words, the topics listed are by way of example.

Boiled down to basics, the congregation reserves the power of self-government, including the right to organize itself, so that, at the local level, its witness and ministry is most effective. Among the powers expressly reserved to the congregation are:

- election of officers of the local congregation (elders, deacons, and trustees),

- calling a pastor or pastors, matters related to the relationship between the pastor and the congregation, such as changing the terms of call, or requesting or consenting or declining to consent to dissolution,

- matters related to major financial impacts on the congregation, such as buying, mortgaging, or selling real property, and

- organization of its local, internal governance, such as lodging all administrative responsibility in the session, or requesting exemption from one or more requirements because of limited size.

Self-government has always been a hallmark of American presbyterianism. As part of their self-governance, congregations, voluntarily give, and through their elected elders, collect and spend the tithes and offerings in order to further their mission and ministry. They do so free from any legal or constitutional power in presbyteries, synods, or general assemblies to tax them or to otherwise confiscate their funds.

In most cases, they purchased and continue to maintain the property that is central to their local ministry and mission through the gifts, tithes and offerings of their local congregations. Congregations alone elect the elders who will lead them and call the pastors who will be their shepherds. Leadership of the local church is not imposed from on high by bishops, cardinals or other hierarchies.

It follows then that the permissive powers of the congregation must include those which protect the congregation from governmental, political, and bureaucratic tyranny.

What are the permissive powers of the congregation?

Any discussion of the powers, both inherent and permissive, of the congregation must start with the understanding that the congregation is not itself a court of the Church. Any suggestion to the contrary is unsupportable by fact or by logic. Unlike the age-old question about the priority of the chicken and the egg, the congregation must precede the session, both temporally and logically. The congregation is the most basic expression of the Church of Jesus Christ. Without the congregation there is no session, and without the congregation, there can be no presbyteries, synods, or a general assembly.

The court of original jurisdiction for the congregation is the session. The presbytery is a court with a wider jurisdiction. It properly has original jurisdiction over the ministers and, to a lesser degree, session, but not the congregation. Presbyteries are not given the power to unilaterally dissolve congregations but can only do so by a process that necessarily involves due process, including conversations with the congregation and other procedural safeguards. Even here, the Book of Order is ambiguous with respect to the issue of dissolution of a congregation. Other than a mere recitation that a presbytery has the power to dissolve a congregation, §G-11.0103i, and the assertion that the property of a dissolved congregation becomes that of the presbytery, §G-8.0601, the Book of Order states no bases upon which a dissolution decision must rest. Thus, a covetous presbytery might consider dissolution for no better reason than to confiscate the property of one of its member churches for the pecuniary gain of the presbytery.

Definition of permissive powers of the congregation is extremely important at this juncture in history. For the first time in over a quarter-century, a significant number of congregations are voicing their desire to terminate their affiliation with the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). In response, the national headquarters of the denomination and various presbyteries are loudly and repeatedly asserting, with no support in either fact or law, that the only avenue for such departure is by way of “dismissal” by the presbytery in which the congregation is situated. Absent dismissal, says the denomination, a congregation is forced to either stay in the PC(USA) or to disband and forfeit its property to the presbytery. (In so doing, they are following that oldest of propaganda rules: a false statement or interpretation, voiced often enough and loudly enough, will soon take on an aura of truth.)

Section G-11.0103i is the only mention in the Book of Order of dismissal as a means of departure from the PC(USA). (Mere reference to §G-11.0103i in §G-8.0601 is not an independent mention of dismissal. ) Section G-11.0103 makes it clear that the congregation (“members”), not the session, is on the other side of the situational equation from the presbytery. Nowhere in the Book of Order is there any mention of how the dismissal process is to be initiated or executed.

There is a presumption that each word contained in a document such as the Book of Order has a meaning and is not mere surplussage. Londonderry, et al. v. Pby of Northern New England, (Remedial Case 213-2, GAPJC 2001)(it is the task of governing bodies and judicial commissions to resolve tensions and ambiguities in the Constitution’s provisions in such a way as to give effect to all provisions).

Giving a presbytery the right to dismiss a congregation presupposes that the congregation can constitutionally request dismissal. To empower a presbytery to respond to a request that a congregation has no authority to make would be a nullity of the first order.

Therefore, because § G-7.0304 makes no specific mention of request for dismissal, the congregation’s right to do so must be one of the “permissive powers” reserved to the congregation.

Some might suggest that this [the power to request dismissal] is a power held by the session. This argument must fail on at least two grounds.

First, the Book of Order is silent as to any power of the session to request dismissal on its own authority.

Second, when considering the other momentous topics that are specifically assigned to action by the congregation, such as pastoral relations and encumbrance of property, the idea that a session could unilaterally commit a congregation to a similar action—dismissal—fails the “smell test.”

Although any resort to common sense in discussions of government or polity is fraught with danger, in this case, it is probably safe to conclude that a presbytery may not unilaterally dismiss a congregation to some other denomination. Cf., Book of Order, anot. 21.194 (“When dealing with a request by a church for dismissal with its property. . .”) (emphasis added).

It then follows that a congregation would have to initiate such a request. However, the proponents of a strict reading of § G-7.0304 would have us believe that the congregation apparently has no constitutional authority to take such action. That erroneous and narrow reading of § G-7.0304 must fail, in favor of some broader permissive right of termination reserved to the congregation. If a request to be dismissed is one of the permissive powers of a congregation, then other similar powers to modify or terminate the voluntary affiliation between congregation and denomination should also be included in that broad, undefined category.

The congregation rather than a “governing body” is granted express power with respect to buying, mortgaging, or selling real property. It would follow that the congregation is also empowered to take at least one other action which impacts on its ownership of its property: maintaining that unfettered ownership even as it decides that it is called to embrace a new denominational affiliation.

By the PC(USA)’s own definition, the congregational meeting discusses property issues, melds individuals into a unified (corporate) congregation, and, repeatedly, gathers information and takes action to forward its mission. Because the church’s property is the home base for its mission to the community, state, nation and the world (cf., Acts 1:8), the congregation (as opposed to any other entity) must have control over its property.

Obviously, after prayer and deliberation, a congregation may actually decide to create a trust and then place its property in that trust for the use and benefit of some other entity, e.g., its presbytery or the PC(USA). However, the decision is that of the congregation, not a unilaterally imposed edict of the denomination.

Boiled down to its basics, at its annual meeting, the congregation asks and answers the following questions:

• Who shall be our leaders?
• What shall we agree and promise to pay our pastor?
• What shall we do with our land, buildings and other property which we, as a congregation have purchased for the purpose of our worship?


All of these questions go directly to the root of the congregation’s unique identity. Surely, the final component of that identity—denominational affiliation—must also be reserved to the congregation. Thus, we add to the foregoing list the question:

• How (by what denominational name) shall we identify ourselves to the community?


Observe that in every instance, these questions go to the core issue of the identity of the congregation.

Accordingly, while a request to be dismissed is clearly one option for terminating denominational affiliation, it is not necessarily the only option under the Book of Order. Because the congregation is the body designated to make such essential missional decisions, absent a clear, unambiguous limitation on congregational authority, unilateral disaffiliation must also be an option open to a congregation. And such power is absolutely necessary to avoid the consequences of a presbytery which, wrongfully or in bad faith, withholds dismissal.

Some might argue that a presbyterian veto is necessary to prevent untoward departures. That is yet another symptom of the modern preference for coercion over trust.

While a presbytery’s deliverances and policy statements are not binding on the membership of the local Church, if a presbytery refuses to give its assent to a request for dismissal, and does so for valid reasons, its statements should be considered worthy of the respect and prayerful consideration of the requesting congregation’s members. Ordinarily, only if dismissal is improperly withheld would resort to unilateral disaffiliation be necessary.

Of course, when evidence exists of presbytery’s predisposition to withhold, such as previous action by the presbytery to ignore dismissal requests or previous resort to administrative commissions or civil suit, immediate resort to disaffiliation would be reasonable. A recent example of such appropriate evidence is the secret distribution by denominational headquarters to the presbyteries in 2005 of two documents: “Church Property Disputes: A Resource For Those Representing Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Presbyteries And True Churches In The Civil Courts” (Office of the General Counsel, PC(USA), rev. 12/05) and “Processes for use by presbyteries in responding to congregations seeking to withdraw,” (Department of Constitutional Services, PC(USA), September 2005).

These documents, which have come to be known as the “Louisville Papers,” are plans for a punitive and pre-emptive legal campaign against congregations merely suspected of considering seeking to leave the denomination.

Despite the attempt by some writers to characterize denominational affiliation as a permanent choice, we all know that members of a congregation may “vote with their feet” and change churches and even denominations at will. The most often used comparison is enlistment in the armed forces. See, e.g., Elder Bill Newkirk “To Leave or Not to Leave: An Open Letter to fellow Presbyterians,” Presbyterian Outlook on-line (03/05/2007) (“What makes anyone think that they can pick up and leave any time something comes along they don't agree with? In the military services they call that desertion.”); Rev. Paige McRight, “Personal reflections on the New Wineskins convocation,” id. (03/12/2007) (“Until I was ten, my father was an Army officer and we lived our lives by military orders. We drove the posted speed limit on base, my dad wore the uniform prescribed in the orders of the day and when the Army said move, we packed.”) But see, Elder Michael R. “Mac” McCarty, “Going Where God Has Ordained Us To Be,” id., (03/21/2007) (“The desertion analogy would be correct only if the PC(USA) were the one true church. But it isn’t. In this case, many congregations have received an order from God to ‘stand detached from the PC(USA) and proceed and report to the EPC for duty.’ God is our commander-in-chief. The entire Church is His. When He issues orders to ‘Go,’ and to ‘Do this,’ obedience of those orders is mandatory. Obedience cannot be desertion because the departure is with authority. The recipient of those orders must pack and go.”)

To wrap up:

A mandatory State-church is anathema to Americans. We cannot send out press gangs to force people to become members of the PC(USA), the EPC, or any other congregation or denomination. People may come and go as the Spirit moves them. If a majority of the individual members of a faith community collectively and collegially determine that they are called to move together, they have the right to do so with the property that they have purchased and maintained for that community and its ministry and mission. Cf., Genesis 12: 5. The suggestion that such a conscientious decision may be made only by individuals, rather than through a corporate decision, can only be the result of a truly bureaucratic mind.

Attempts to coerce continued membership through the use of unnecessarily bureaucratic and dilatory processes and the in terrorem effect of confiscatory “property trusts” are doomed to failure. Although parishioners are naturally emotionally tied to “their” church [building], faith and God’s call will ultimately lead faithful believers to abandon their baggage if faithfulness so requires.

The claim that power to sever relations with an entire congregation is reserved solely to the presbytery does not appear in the Book of Order. In order for such power to reside in the presbytery alone, Book of Order § G-11.0301 would have to read:

T h e presbytery is responsible for the mission and government of the church throughout its geographical district. It therefore has the sole responsibility and power
* * *
i . to divide, dismiss, or dissolve churches; . . ..


This wording is obviously unworkable when one applies it to the other 26 subparagraphs of § G-11.0301. Instead, a separate provision would be needed, for example:

G-11:0301.1

a. The presbytery has the sole responsibility and power to divide, dismiss, or dissolve churches within its geographical district.

b. Dismissal is the only constitutionally permissible means for a congregation to sever its relationship with the PC(USA) and its presbytery.

Obviously, the PC(USA) has taken no such action to limit the decision to depart to the presbytery. In fact, the absence of such a clear and specific proscription led the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to recognize disaffiliation as a permissive option for a congregation. See, Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex, 489 A.2d 1317, 1324 (Pa. 1985) (“[t]he Constitution [of the UPCUSA] does not prohibit a congregation from disaffiliating . . .”; “when the local body voluntarily affiliated with the UPCUSA’s predecessor. . .”) (emphasis added).

In the ensuing 24 years, the PC(USA) has ignored that decision and its inherent warning and has taken no action whatsoever to remedy the absence of such a bar to disaffiliation. Until it does, the Book of Order is ambiguous and that ambiguity ought to be construed in favor of a reading of § G-7.0304a(5) to reserve to congregations a permissive power to disaffiliate.

Here endeth the lesson.

GEORGE SANTAYANA WAS RIGHT

Welcome to a new Blog I have created for those times when someone says something really stupid which requires a single long response. Early in my blogging experience, one of the masters of the art, Rev. Bill Crawford, reminded me that short is sweet. Said he, "If you have a long response, break it up into parts."

Ordinarily, I agree with Bill. But sometimes someone writes something so incredibly naive, so out of touch with the real but sinful nature of the world in which we live, that it needs to be answered all at once.

Now, one can always respond right on the blog which posted the comment, but it is bad form to hijack someone else's blog for a lengthy reply. At the same time, on my regular blog,I am in the midst of a series that has a historic deadline. So, for this innaugural response, I answer a response by a reader to a short blog dated 13 December 2008 appearing over at The Reformed Pastor.

On December 13, David Fischler, The Reformed Pastor, posted the following “Quote of the Day”:

Today is Dec. 7, the day that this government killed over 80,000 Japanese civilians at Hiroshima in 1941, two days before killing an additional 64,000 Japanese civilians at Nagasaki by dropping nuclear bombs on innocent people.

–The Rev. Jeremiah Wright, preaching at Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago on December 7.

It made me sick, but considering the evident lack of basic historical education of the speaker, a response quoting that eminent philosopher, Bluto Blutarsky, seemed to handle things very well.

But then, a usually erudite commentator posted an even more appalling response, as follows:

The Japanese civilians killed in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were just as innocent as all those civilians killed in any war. Wright is correct. We can argue whether the bombings were justified or not. It did end the war. God does judge the nations. Do you think God will let us off easy on this one?

John McNeese

I am praying that John was kidding, but I am afraid that he was serious.

The absolute ignorance of our own history that appears in both the quote and the response, the blame America first mind-set, and the willingness of some Americans to swallow the lies of the Japanese and American apologists for Japanese duplicity and barbarism, is reprehensible.

I’ll say this for Rev. Wright, however. He’s not as bad as a high school teacher who, when the insipid motion picture Pearl Harbor premiered, taught a friend’s daughter that “America deserved it because we dropped the bomb on the Japanese for no reason.” Arrrrrgh!

Disclosure

First, I apologize for the length of this post. Ordinarily, on the sage advice of the Bayou Christian, I would have broken it down.

But because the impetus for this post is something so monumentally stupid and because it evidences a sad lack of knowledge of fundamental American history, I think it it needs to be said in one seemless document.


Furthermore,in the interests of full disclosure, I need to say that I was 18 before I knew that “goddamnsneakyjapsonsabitches” was not one word.

My Dad enlisted in the Navy in 1940, and by 1941 he had been at sea aboard USS Relief (AH-1) for a year. On 7 December, Relief was anchored at Gander, Newfoundland, providing medical support to a US Army radio station there.

He remained aboard Relief until late November 1944, when the ship finally returned to the States for a much needed overhaul in anticipation of the Invasion of Japan. In other words, he was at sea in Relief for some 50 consecutive months, 36 of them in war-time.

Dad was detached and ordered to report to Yosemite National Park, where he was Chief Petty Officer-in-charge of construction and provisioning at the National Park Service hotel which was to become one of a number of new west coast Naval Hospitals to receive wounded from the invasion of Japan.

Dad and Mom had married in February 1942, just before Relief sailed to the Pacific. While there, Dad was the leading Chief in the Collecting and Clearing Company of Relief’s embarked Naval Hospital. He and his pharmacist’s mates would make runs in to the beach, triage the casualties, and send them back to the ship in order of priority.

Between November 1943 and October 1944, Dad participated in 5 bloody invasions in the Pacific—Tarawa (Nov 1943), Kwajalien (Feb 1944), Saipan (Jun 1944), Tinian (July 1944) and Pelelieu (Sep 1944).

Mom was delighted to have him home. She told him that she was ready to start a family. Dad refused, although he probably agreed to practice making babies. It had been a long cruise! His reason for saying "No"?

“When we invade Japan, they will send me back. I won’t come home from that one. I’ve used up all my luck. I won’t leave you a young widow with a baby.”

I was born on 13 May 1946. Do the math. I’m a memento of a really good VJ-Day celebration.

When I was teaching Military Law and the Law of War at The (Marine Corps) Basic School (1983-85), I was often invited by the lieutenants to be a guest at their formal mess nights. At one such dinner, an Air Force Major General was seated at the head table as an honored guest. It turns out that his youngest son was a member of the class. I later learned that he was a crew member of Bock’s Car on 9 August 1945. Name doesn’t ring a bell? That was the B-29 that dropped the one that finally got Japan's attention.

Later that night (actually at about 0300), long after the President of the Mess had announced, “Gentlemen, will you join me at the bar?”, I wandered out to the formal garden behind O’Bannon Hall to get a breath of air. I just happened to have three cold ones with me—still in the plastic loops.

Suddenly, a match flared. The General was sitting there, smoking his pipe.

“Sorry, sir,” I said. “Didn’t mean to disturb you.”

“That’s quite all right, Colonel. Care to have a seat?”

I offered and he accepted a beer, and we sat and enjoyed the night. Finally, I told him about my Dad and his premonition.

“I want to thank you, sir,” I said. “I’m here because of you.”

“Aw, hell, son." He patted me on the knee. "We did it for you.”

And for the Jeremiah Wrights and the John McNeeses and all the other folks in this world who just cannot understand.

A Little History

On 8 December, President Roosevelt addressed the Congress, saying (in pertinent part):

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, members of the Senate and the House of Representatives: yesterday, December 7th, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that nation, and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. . . .

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. . . .

But always will our whole nation remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory.

I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us. . . .

With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7th, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

He had it just right. They sucker-punched us and the American people “in their righteous might” came together to set things straight.

The Marine Corps launched the road to victory on 7 August 1942, 8 months to the day after Pearl Harbor. The First Marine Division, God bless 'em, landed at Guadalcanal and began a 6 month operation to shake the enemy loose. Guadalcanal was the start of the westernmost pincer of the road to Tokyo, then up the Solomons, and then New Guinea, and then the Philippines and Pelelieu to Okinawa.

The eastern pincer began in November 1943 at "Bloody" Tarawa, when the Second Marine Division suffered 5,000 casualties in 76 hours of fighting to capture what the Japanese CO had said 1,000,000 men could not take in 1,000 years. Still, the Japanese soldiers fought to the last man, making certain that the cost to the United States was as high as possible.

At Saipan,in June 1944, not only did the Japanese military fight to the death, they made sure the civilians on the island suffered, too.

The invasion began on 15 June 1944 with landings by the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions and 27th Infantry Division. In response, the IJN sent a carrier task force to attack the invasion. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June) Task Force 58 broke the back of Japanese Naval aviation. In what history remembers as "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot," TF58 destroyed nearly 400 enemy aircraft and their experienced pilots, sank three IJN carriers, and ended any real Japanese air threat to the fleet—for awhile, until the "Divine Wind" began to blow.

Meanwhile, back on Saipan, with resupply now an impossibility, the battle became hopeless for the defenders. Nonetheless, the Japanese were determined to fight to the last man. General Saito organized his troops into a line anchored on Mount Tapotchau in the defensible mountainous terrain of central Saipan. Attacking over and through "Hell's Pocket", "Purple Heart Ridge" and "Death Valley", our soldiers and Marines pressed forward, at high cost.

By July 7, the Japanese had nowhere to retreat. General Saito made plans for a final suicidal banzai charge. At dawn, the remaining able-bodied Japanese troops — about 3,000 men — charged forward in the final attack. The Japanese surged over two battalions of American troops, killing or wounding 650 of them. The attack was defeated by that afternoon.

As for the remaining civilians on the island, Saito said, "There is no longer any distinction between civilians and troops. It would be better for them to join in the attack with bamboo spears than be captured."

Saito, along with commanders Hirakushi and Igeta, committed suicide, and almost the entire garrison of Japanese troops on the island — at least 30,000 — died. Additionally, some 22,000 Japanese civilians also died, despite frantic efforts by U.S. troops to persuade them to surrender. Most committed suicide in the last days of the battle.

US troops were stunned to see parents throwing their children from "Suicide Cliff" and "Banzai Cliff" and then jumping themselves. Japanese propaganda on Saipan and in Japan portrayed Americans as "devils" who would kill civilian men, rape and kill the women, and eat the children. (Disgustingly, it was actually the Japanese who were eating American POWs. See James Bradley’s recent book, Flyboys.)

American losses at Saipan were 2,949 killed in action and 10,364 wounded in action (a 19% casualty rate).

Next, on 21 July, the 3rd Marine Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and the 77th Infantry Division made amphibious landings on Guam, approximately 100 miles south of Saipan. By nightfall the Americans had established beachheads about 2,000 meters deep. Japanese counter-attacks were made throughout the first few days of the battle, mostly at night, using infiltration tactics. Several times they penetrated the American defenses and were driven back with heavy loss of men and equipment.
By mid-August 4, the Guam was secured.

As in other battles of the Pacific War, on Guam, the Japanese refused to surrender, and almost all were killed.(The last Japanese soldier surrendered in the Phillippines in 1972! They weren't real big on surrendering.) At Guam, US casualties were nearly eight thousand, including more than one thousand killed in action. Japanese losses included 17,500 killed.

On 24 July 1944, the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions landed on Tinian, an island about 4 miles from Saipan.

Japanese forces on Tinian included the 50th Infantry Regiment, the 56th Keibitai (Naval Guard Force), four Army infantry battalions and the 18th Infantry Tank Company with nine tanks, totaling 8,350 men.

The Japanese commander was Colonel Takashi Ogata who was aware that an invasion was imminent and worked furiously to improve the island's defenses. Ogata prepared to destroy his enemy at the water's edge and if that failed, his plan was to order his men to fall back to prepared positions inland and defend them to the last man.

By nightfall on 24 July, the 4th Marine Division had established a beach head 2,900 meters wide and almost two kilometers inland. On this first day, American casualties were 15 killed and 225 wounded. During the night of the 24 July,” Colonel Ogata launched a five-hour counter attack at a cost of 1,241 killed and six tanks lost.

The Marines turned south and proceeded over the next several days to the southern tip of Guam. Colonel Ogata made his last stand in the south on July 31st and was killed by machine gun fire while leading a counter attack. He was last seen hanging over Marine barbed wire.

On 7 August, the island was declared secured. American losses totaled 328 killed and 1,571 wounded. The Japanese lost their entire garrison of 8,000 men.

With the capture of Tinian, work was immediately commenced on turning it into a massive air field. Soon, the XXth Air Force with its new long-range B-29s began to attack the Home Islands. One of those islands was Iwo Jima.

There was a Japanese early-warning radar installation on Iwo Jima which alerted the Home Islands of approaching attacks. Fighter aircraft based on three airfields on Iwo Jima attacked the XXth Air Force B-29s which were especially vulnerable on their way to Japan because of their heavily bomb and fuel loads. Additionally, because of the distance between Tinian and the Home Islands, the Air Corps began to lose battle-damaged planes and crews that had nowhere else to go. At about the mid-point between Tinian and Tokyo, Iwo Jima could serve as a haven.

Accordingly, on 19 February 1945, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions landed on Iwo Jima. The 3d Marine Division was in reserve.

The battle was the first American attack on the Japanese Home Islands and the Imperial soldiers defended their positions tenaciously. The Japanese positions on the island were heavily fortified, with vast bunkers, hidden artillery, and 11 miles of underground tunnels.

In June 1944, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was assigned to command the defense of Iwo Jima. Rather than contest a beach landing, Kuribayashi ordered the creation of strong, mutual supporting positions in depth utilized the advantages of being in a defensive position to use static and heavy weapons and tanks were used as camouflaged artillery positions. Hidden artillery and mortar positions along with land mines were placed all over the island.

The battle saw also the introduction of a new weapon by the Japanese, the Kamikaze.

Kuribayashi knew that Japan could not win the battle, but he hoped to inflict massive casualties on the American forces, so that the United States would reconsider an invasion of the Japanese main islands.

The fighting was extremely fierce. The Americans' advance was stalled by numerous defensive positions augmented by artillery, where they were ambushed by Japanese troops that occasionally sprung out of tunnels. On February 23, 1945, Suribachi fell. Despite the loss of Mount Suribachi (located on the south end of the island), the Japanese still held strong positions on the north end.

After running out of most water, food, and supplies, the Japanese troops became desperate towards the end of the battle. Kuribayashi, who had argued against banzai attacks at the start of the battle, realized that Japanese defeat was imminent. Marines began to face increasing numbers of nighttime attacks; these were only repelled by a combination of machine gun defensive positions and artillery support. At times, the Marines engaged in hand-to-hand fighting to repel the Japanese attacks.

On the night of March 25, a 300-man Japanese force launched a final counterattack in the vicinity of Airfield Number 2. Army pilots, Seabees and Marines of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and 28th Marines fought the Japanese force until morning but suffered heavy casualties (more than 100 Americans were killed and another 200 were wounded). The island was officially declared "secured" by the U.S. command the following day.

Of the over 22,000 Japanese soldiers entrenched on the island, 20,703 died either from fighting or by ritual suicide. Only 1,083 were captured during the battle. The Americans suffered 27,909 casualties, with 6,825 killed in action.

By war’s end, 2,251 B-29 Superfortress (with crews of 10 or more) made emergency landings on Iwo Jima.

[Aside: Talk about “righteous might!” In the 1990s, when the Air Force proposed to build its national Air Force Memorial in a position that would over-shadow the Marine Corps War Memorial (a depiction in bronze of 5 Marines and a Corpsman raising a flag on, you guessed it, Iwo Jima), the resultant fire-storm of public opinion made Tokyo in March 1945 look like a marshmallow roast. The entire Air Force finally took note that two or three 80 year old vets of the 5th Marine Division, those steely-eyed killers, were planning to come to DC for a little heart-to-heart about 28,000 dead and wounded Marines and sailors and 25,000 live Air Force air-crew and being rude and ungrateful, and stuff like that. (I suspect that one Marine came to hold the second Marine's coat, while the third would sell tickets.)

The Air Force backed-down. Smart move! Semper Fi!!]

On the night of 9–10 March, some 279 B-29s left Tinian and Guam and raided Tokyo, dropping around 1,700 tons of bombs. Approximately 16 square miles of the wood and paper city were destroyed and at least 100,000 people (some sources would double, triple or even quadruple that number, suggesting that Japan had propaganda reasons to hide the real numbers) were killed by the bombs or in the resulting firestorm.

In other words, there were more immediate deaths from this conventional raid, which took place just a short distance from the Imperial Palace, than from the atomic attacks (not nuclear, Rev. Wright!)on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

By comparison, at the end of 1945, an estimated 140,000 people in Hiroshima and 80,000 in Nagasaki were dead as a result of the atomic attack, roughly half occurring in each city on the days of the bombings.

The next objective was Okinawa, where the First and Sixth Marine Divisions landed as part of X Corps on Easter Sunday, 1 April 1945. 82 days later, the island was declared secure.

Like Iwo Jima, the Okinawa land campaign was mainly defensive, with the intent of inflicting massive American casualties in the hope that the US would sue for peace. The Japanese also used kamikaze tactics as a major part of the defense. In the first 8 weeks of the campaign, seven major kamikaze attacks were attempted, involving more than 1,500 planes. The U.S. Navy sustained greater casualties in this operation than in any other battle of the war.

In the three-month battle for Okinawa, the Japanese flew 1,900 kamikaze missions, sinking dozens of Allied ships and killing more than 5,000 U.S. sailors at the cost of 1,465 expended kamikaze planes....

U.S. losses were over 48,000 casualties, of whom over 12,000 were killed or missing—over twice the number of casualties as at Iwo Jima and Guadalcanal combined. Several thousand servicemen who died indirectly (from wounds and other causes) at a later date are not included in the total. The U.S. Navy's dead exceeded its wounded with 4,907 killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks.

By one count, there were about 107,000 Japanese combatants killed and 7,400 captured. Some of the soldiers committed seppuku or simply blew themselves up with hand grenades. In addition, about 20,000 were sealed in their caves alive.

The battle has one of the highest number of casualties of any World War Two engagement: the Japanese lost over 100,000 troops, and the United States suffered more than 50,000 casualties, with over 12,000 killed in action. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed, wounded or attempted suicide. Approximately one-fourth of the civilian population died due to the invasion.

At some battles, such as at Iwo Jima, there had been no civilians involved, but Okinawa had a large indigenous civilian population and, according to various estimates, somewhere between 1/10 and 1/3 of them died during the battle.[Okinawan civilian losses in the campaign were estimated to be between 100,000 and 150,000 dead. The U.S. Army figures for the campaign showed a total figure of 142,058 civilian casualties, including those who were pressed into service by the Japanese Imperial Army.]

As should be evident, from early on,Japan had no national intent to surrender. In fact, at Saipan and Okinawa, both considered to be home islands,the plan to make full use of civilians to prolong the fighting and to increase American casualties was honed.

Now, To Respond To Some Statements1.

To John and Jerry: This government did not kill any “innocent people.” Their own government did that for them. We just made it a lot quicker and cleaner for them, while saving a couple hundred thousand guys like my Dad from being killed and another 800,000 to 1.3 million from having their otherwise clean Health Records all messed up. Oh, and all those millions of school boys and school girls who would have died with bamboo spears in their hands or withgrenades tucked inside their clothing.

You ask, “Their government…? No, their government didn't kill them.”

Awwwww, I buy you books, send you to school, and you eat the covers. Read the background.

You guys seem to think that the Japanese government was going to suddenly see the light, the bright light, the great white light and come to its senses. Sure they were, just as soon as they ran out of kamikaze pilots and people who would line up to be in local “blood and iron brigades”, who wanted only to take my Dad or some other Marine or soldier to wherever good little bushido-babies go after they stop being people.

Their government told them that Hirohito was God, that they alone were people, and all others were gaijin (barbarians, or in the language of their late buddies in Europe, untermenschen), that the Americans were going to kill and eat them, and that it would be really cool to die like a samurai. And if Saipan and Okinawa are evidence, the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Kobe and Tokyo—what was left of it—believed them.

2. But couldn’t we have dropped them a note saying “Pretty, pretty, pretty please, with fish heads and sake on it, please, surrender—or we are going to do a one-second slum clearance on Nagoya.”

I guess, but if they hadn’t gotten the idea that we meant business on 9-10 March, it probably wasn’t going to work. And don’t forget—we waited three days between Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and they still didn’t quit.

About the only utility that that note might have had would have been for the Prime Minister, as he walked to the binjo (head, lavatory, bathroom, etc).

3. But they were civilians. . . .

Yeah, and so were about 12 million Americans until 0755 Hawaii time on Sunday, 7 December 1941. And almost all of them had Moms or sisters or daughters or girlfriends. Can you imagine the reaction in America if all those Japanese civilians did as they were told and started taking out our guys in the hundreds of thousands and it came out that we had the means of stopping the war and did not use it?

The hangman at Nuremburg could have made one more of Mary Surratt’s necklaces, medium small, for a former haberdasher from Missouri—if the “American people in their righteous might” didn’t just find a rope and a local tree and skip all those unnecessary formalities.

4. But they were civilians. . . .

Yeah, and those nice, genteel folks who lived just outside the gate at Auschwitz and Belsen-Bergen were innocent of any knowledge of what was cookin’ there—you will pardon the expression. Probably thought someone had left dinner on the barbee just a little too long.

This was a people believed in the deity of their Emperor, who yelled “Banzai” in the movie theaters when they saw newsreels of their army in China using women and babies for bayonet practice and other innocent civilians to test the sharpness of their swords.

In his book Ripples of Battle, Victor Davis Hanson, writes:

"...because the Japanese on Okinawa, including native Okinawans, were so fierce in their defense (even when cut off, and without supplies), and because casualties were so appalling, many American strategists looked for an alternative means to subdue mainland Japan, other than a direct invasion. This means presented itself, with the advent of atomic bombs, which worked admirably in convincing the Japanese to sue for peace, without American casualties. Ironically, the American conventional fire-bombing of major Japanese cities (which had been going on for months before Okinawa) was far more effective at killing civilians than the atomic bombs and, had the Americans simply continued, or expanded this, the Japanese would likely have surrendered anyway. Nevertheless, the bombs were a powerful symbolic display of American power, and the Japanese capitulated, obviating the need for an invasion of the home islands."

Makes perfect sense to me!

About 14 years ago, I was at the National Air and Space Museum in DC, with my father-in-law, a WWII vet. This was the summer before the Enola Gay dust up. In the area where the cockpit of the Enola Gay was going to be displayed, the museum had a display about the 9-10 March raids on Tokyo. The tape was a continuous loop.

There were about 25 Japanese tourists, including a couple of kids of about 13. They were talking to one another in Japanese. Finally, one man looked around, and in almost a shout, he said, “Oh, my son. I do not know why they would do such terrible things to our people.”

Without missing a beat, my father-in-law tapped the kid on the shoulder. He turned around and looked up at this towering gentle giant.

“Well, son,” said my father-in-law. “Let this be a lesson to you. Americans don’t take kindly to sneaky little foreigners who kill our sailors in their sleep without declaring war. Didn’t then. Don’t now. Hope we never will!”

There was a stunned silence and sagging mouths that made it obvious that our visitors understood English very well.

So did the Americans in the area—-my father-in-law’s voice tends to carry. There was a loud cheer and a lot of “Damn rights!”

So, I will weep for the Arizona sailors and Marines who still rest in their shattered ship before I have any concern for the people who put them there.

And because we invoked God’s name and asked for His help (“With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.”), He gave us the tools to stop the march of evil across the Pacific. I think—I pray—that He . . . "will let us off easy on this one.”